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a holistic, ethical, and concrete theory of the role different types 
of technology ought to have in our lives, of the steps needed 
to make such an assessment—a framework that presents 
normative guidelines for engineers, designers, policymakers, 
parents, caregivers, and others concerned with how technology 
may or may not contribute to a good life. I have only recently 
been able to start developing this approach, and I would be very 
grateful for any criticism and constructive suggestions. At the 
very least, I hope that this preliminary and cursory overview is 
sufficient to convey its potential advantage and utility, and to 
start a fruitful discussion on the role of prudential value and 
empirical research in ethics of technology.
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Endnotes
1. Again, there is no room for a full critique in this paper, nor 
is that my main purpose, but I discuss this in more detail in 
Søraker 2010.
2. Although a full defence is beyond the scope of this paper, I 
presuppose a variant of Fred Feldman’s “Intrinsic Attitudinal 
Hedonism,” but one that is “confidence-adjusted” rather than 
“truth-adjusted.” I defend this approach in Søraker 2010, and 
more systematically in a forthcoming publication.
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“Friend” Is a Verb
D.E. Wittkower
Old Dominion University
People linked together by friendship, affection, or 
physical love found themselves reduced to hunting for 
tokens of their past communion within the compass 
of a ten-word telegram. And since, in practice, 
the phrases one can use in a telegram are quickly 
exhausted, long lives passed side by side, or passionate 
yearnings, soon declined to the exchange of such trite 
formulas as: “Am well. Always thinking of you. Love.”
 —The Plague, Albert Camus (1991, 69)
In the situation described in this passage, surely much of the 
problem follows from the very short form of the communication 
possible. Twitter exchanges seem luxurious, indulgent by 
comparison. But surely much of the problem follows from the 
format, regardless of length. “Mutual sympathy” is equated 
here with “flesh and heart,” and surely we today agree with 
Camus that there is a kind of intimacy and connection far easier 
to establish in face-to-face interaction, or, more accurately, 
body-to-body interaction (Fortunati 2005, 53), than in writing, 
no matter whether that writing is limited to ten words. And 
yet, while the centrality of co-presence and body-to-body 
interaction might be of unquestionably central concern to 
erotic relationships, it is far less clear that it should be crucial 
to friendship. Why, exactly, does writing seem to us to be such 
a poor substitute for physically co-present interaction within 
the realm of friendship as well?
— Philosophy and Computers —
— 23 —
The Aristotelian tradition of thought on friendship had 
accustomed us to dividing friendships between those of virtue, 
of pleasure, and of utility (and to disparaging the latter two). This 
puts us on a path to view formal and final causes as determining 
of friendship—the most prominent distinction between them 
has to do with their ends, and the friendship of pleasure, 
concerned so much more with a passing experience than a 
lasting goal, seems cheap; a guilty pleasure. But friendships with 
all sorts of formal and final causes have efficient and material 
causes as well, and these cannot be ignored or discarded.
In terms of formal and final causes we might say that 
friendship may be based on shared concerns, mutual support 
in acting on personal and political commitments, principled 
disagreement and debate, a similar sense of human, shared 
interests, or common activities and pastimes. In efficient and 
material aspects, the basis of friendship is found in complaining 
about the soup, walking together silently, passionate debate, 
laughing about something unimportant, shopping, playing cards, 
drinking beer, sharing music, and being bored. Friendship is 
not a static fact, but a πραξις; part of the active rather than 
the contemplative aspect of living—and it must be enacted in 
order to exist.
We are all familiar with the challenges of maintaining a 
friendship over distances. The practice of friendship, when 
placed within the context of the longhand letter, must attempt to 
realize a portion of active life using tools proper to contemplative 
life. As Vallor puts it, 
Initially, the possibilities for sharing lives online look 
relatively impoverished if we grasp the distinction 
between sharing lives and sharing about lives; the 
former involves performing together the activities that 
make up a life, the latter involves communicating to 
one another information concerning our lives, without 
implying shared activity. (forthcoming, n.p.)
And not only is shared activity seemingly precluded, but the 
sharing which is possible tends towards reporting only those 
aspects of life which appear to us objectively meaningful, 
removing access to a large portion of what life is to each of 
us as it is lived, and what would have been shared in a life 
lived together. “Sharing about” can capture well something of 
the final cause of friendship—our common values, passions, 
interests, or humor—but it is hard to see how the written form 
could contain the material causes of friendship.
A life lived alongside another is disfigured when transferred 
into narrative: the trivialities of life are no longer a binding 
connection, but instead the subject of reportage, and the 
vibrancy of life can only be made again engaging through 
literary talent on the part of the letter-writer or the empathetic 
imagination of the reader. As Schopenhauer said, when we 
view an individual human life objectively in all its many and 
varied details, 
it is like a drop of water seen through a microscope, 
a single drop teeming with infusoria; or a speck of 
cheese full of mites invisible to the naked eye. How 
we laugh as they bustle about so eagerly, and struggle 
with one another in so tiny a space! And whether here, 
or in the little span of human life, this terrible activity 
produces a comic effect.
It is only in the microscope that our life looks so big. 
It is an indivisible point, drawn out and magnified by 
the powerful lenses of Time and Space. (2007, 25)
Once we live apart from a friend, and share our lives 
only through the time-shifted asynchronous written word 
communicated at a distance, the magnifying lenses of time and 
space are no longer shared. Our own days are encountered 
through a microscope, and each moment is one whose passage 
we feel, no matter how unimportant its content. In speaking to 
the distant friend, however, we view our life as from afar, and 
we find ourselves answering simply “Not much” when asked 
“What have you been up to?” as if we were limited to the space 
of a telegram as in Camus’s story.
There are certainly friendships that continue and strengthen 
in important aspects when this transition takes place—Briggle 
(2008) provides an excellent example of pen-pals who are better 
able to share meaningful and deeply personal thoughts due to 
their lack of a shared location. This can be expected to occur 
in proportion as the friendship has its basis within final and 
formal causes rather than efficient and material causes; within 
commitments and projects held in common rather than jokes, 
movies, and boredom; and, most broadly, within contemplative 
life rather than active life. But even the friendship based on 
common values or on intellectual exchange is still a friendship 
realized in moments lived and shared, and when fully abstracted 
into an exchange of letters it becomes a placeholder for and 
shadow of its true form.
Or, at least, this was the case until recently.
I began this section by asking why physically co-present 
interaction seemed to us to be so central to friendship, and 
why written interaction seemed to us to be such a poor 
substitute. Although this fits the way many often think about 
and talk about friendship, there are surely a great many 
Facebook users who do not see the dire consequences for 
friendship that theorists and commentators so frequently 
bemoan, and many today, markedly but not exclusively 
tweens and teens, see nothing strange about choosing 
to IM or text someone who is easily available in person. I 
don’t believe this is because there’s something wrong with 
“these kids today,” or because we’ve lost the “true meaning 
of friendship,” or because new social media have brought 
our society into “the shallows.” I think it’s because we’re 
wrong to think of Facebook posts, texts, tweets, and many 
other forms of new social media communication as written 
language; or, perhaps less paradoxically put, that writing is 
increasingly an active and shared activity between distant 
persons rather than an act of individually composing and 
subsequently sharing meaning and information.
Changing Communications
Email has been much decried for the way in which the ease, 
speed, and weightlessness of email communication has 
resulted in a decline in emphasis upon spelling, grammar, 
formalities, and etiquette. Moving from email to other new 
media communications, we see this decline continue, as well as 
seeing a positive rise in norms of casual, creative, and informal 
usage, either through convenience (e.g., “ur” for “yours,” or 
the foregoing of apostrophes, which the iOS virtue keyboard 
puts on a separate screen) or through individual or collective 
identity construction (as in the case of “l337” typographical 
conventions or speech patterns stylized after LOLcats, Y U NO 
guy, or innumerable other Internet memes).
We are not wrong to fear and lament the loss of habits 
of thoughtful composition and proper language use, even if 
there are, as I will argue, some positive aspects to this change 
as well. As the speed and frequency of writing has increased, 
writing as a practice has become increasingly more functional 
than thoughtful, and has moved from contemplative to active 
life. Heidegger even claimed that this process, which he saw 
at a far earlier stage in the mere act of abbreviating of words 
(1968, 34-5), threatens the very existence of meditative thought 
as we use words more and more as tools rather than as bearers 
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of meaning. The phenomenological changes that bring about 
this danger, through our loss of wider perspectives and our 
increasing incapacity to step back and consider things carefully 
and as a whole, bring writing within the realm of the trivial, 
functional, and immediate. The momentary writing of new 
social media loses the slow and deep aspects of traditional 
written thought, but gains the immediacy and vibrancy of 
momentary speech.
Along with this change in the form and experience of 
writing, the subjects of communication have undergone a 
similar alteration. The over-sharing and micro-reporting of 
the stereotypical constant texter or tweeter exemplify the 
most mindless and unimportant form of sociality. And yet, it is 
technologies such as these—and for exactly this reason—that 
are able, finally, to recreate at a distance those “microscopic 
lenses of time and space” which allow two people to have 
the shared experiences that form the material and efficient 
causes of friendship. This destroys the distance that results in 
the report, “I didn’t really do anything today,” when we have 
been busy from dawn to dusk with meaningless errands. 
Through constant tweets and texts, we can be bored and 
frustrated constantly alongside one another—indeed, the 
tweeter may very well bring a lived experience of boredom 
to all his friends, much to their annoyance. As obnoxious as 
this may be, it does indeed replicate the element of friendship 
most easily lost in distance.
Here we see a resurgent orality in writing itself—a kind of 
secondary literacy based in and taking its characteristics from 
orality; a kind of distorted mirror image of Ong’s secondary 
orality. Secondary orality is “superficially identical with that of 
primary orality but in depth utterly contrary, planned and self-
conscious where primary 
orality is unplanned and 
unselfconscious” (Ong 1977, 
298). While secondary orality 
is oral language derivative of 
written language, secondary 
literacy partakes in various 
a n d  u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d 
mixtures of literacy and 
resurgent orality. Some 
new social media writing 
is composed with care 
and concern for meaning, 
support, and precision in 
expression, and is altogether 
in line with our pre-digital 
expectations for the written 
word. Some is entirely 
contextually bound and 
written extemporaneously 
from within an ongoing 
conversation. Most, of course, is some unknowable admixture 
between the written form and this resurgent orality, and many of 
the conflicts which take place in new social media can be traced 
back to different proportions of literacy and orality adopted by 
those in conversation. One user’s thoughtful and respectful 
discourse is another’s tl;dr, and both serious communication 
and sarcastic or absurdist banter fit within the norms of new 
social media writing.
Facebook Friending
The flexibility and multiplicity of communication structures in 
Facebook form a platform for the practice of friendship which 
is able to provide the active experience of proximity seen in 
texting and tweeting, while providing scalable avenues towards 
more robust forms of communication and sharing. As Baym 
makes clear in her discussion of media multiplexity in personal 
relationships, closer relationships are conducted over more 
numerous media (2010, 132). Facebook, as a communications 
platform, can be used in very thin, one-dimensional forms of 
communication, but its capacity for a variety of different sorts of 
communication leaves multiplexity as an open possibility within 
all relationships conducted in part over Facebook.
Status updates supply the opportunity to be present with the 
other in quotidian trivialities, but do so in a minimally invasive 
general broadcast rather than a specific communication that 
might obligate the other to respond. At the same time, the 
publication of interests, personal details, notes, postings, and 
videos allows others to hear from one and learn about one’s 
current interests and concerns, and for one to share with 
others without having to decide to communicate with anyone 
in particular. In general, it is a pull-oriented interpersonal 
communications platform. Rather than the “push” of 
information outward in the letter, phone call, email, or SMS, 
a great proportion of the communication that takes place is 
generated as static content and “pulled down” by viewers of 
personal pages.
In these ways, the Facebook page is a venue for allowing 
others to get a sense of the texture of our day-to-day lives, 
without explicitly inviting anybody to follow it day-by-day. 
This certainly has its negative aspects, such as the now well-
established practice of Facebook stalking, but it also means that 
there is, in effect, always an open door for our connections to 
get to know us better.
Targeted communication within one’s network is also 
always a possibility. Messaging allows for private or personal 
responses to public conversations, or for conversations requiring 
intimacy or seclusion—and 
within this slower, more 
email-like communicative 
channel, longer-form writing 
with a lesser resurgent 
orality can take place in, as 
it were, a quiet side-room 
from the buzz of the friend 
feed. But more active forms 
of direct communication 
are also possible. The “like” 
button functions much like a 
head nod or an encouraging 
“uh-huh” in body-to-body 
communication. Cuonzo 
(2010) argues that part of the 
function of virtual gifts is a 
kind of post-linguistic social 
grooming, in keeping with 
Dunbar’s gossip hypothesis 
(1997). The purpose, then, of 
sending someone a flower in a Facebook application, or poking 
or throwing a sheep at them, is simply to re-establish contact 
and revitalize a social bond. These things are in some sense 
meaningless, of course, but so is much of the small talk we 
engage in regularly, and both serve the same social purpose.
All this, however, approaches Facebook merely as a 
communications platform. In addition to this, Facebook is 
able to provide a platform for asynchronous shared activities. 
To some extent, this is clearly possible through the other 
communications technologies discussed previously—I may 
certainly send you a video by email which we can then share 
our thoughts on, in the same way as I might send you a letter 
recommending visiting a certain museum—but the multimedia 
integration of Facebook walls and applications allows for a 
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And yet, it is technologies such as 
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weightless, immediate, and intuitive approach to distant shared 
media experiences. Furthermore, the embedded display of 
linked visual media on the one hand, and the small text-entry 
windows on the other, both encourage that communications 
tend to become an asynchronously shared experience of 
media along with a comment, rather than a written message 
containing a link to some content referred to. The integration 
of applications allows collaborative or competitive games 
and projects to create even more concrete and interactive 
asynchronous shared experiences.
This is where I disagree with Vallor’s otherwise excellent 
article, “Flourishing on Facebook.” Vallor characterizes our 
actions in new social media as “communicating to one another 
information concerning our lives” and “providing the kinds of 
informational and emotional reciprocity that maintain the will 
to live together with our friends” (forthcoming, n.p.). I find 
instead that the writing that takes place in new social media, 
in line with the idea of resurgent orality, is better characterized 
as a shared activity rather than mere information sharing. 
Just as in a conversation in person, what we enjoy is not the 
information but rather the back-and-forth, the playfulness of 
banter, and the closeness and connection with our friend, so 
too do we in new social media often find our conversations to 
be more about activity than about content. As with in-person 
conversations, the content itself certainly wouldn’t always 
(often?) merit the time we spend on it—but that it is time 
spent with friends does.
Similarly, I see no reason to describe the performance of 
reciprocity as going no further than a demonstration of the will 
to live together—is there not enough reason to call it a way of 
actually living together asynchronously and at a distance, at 
least within a limited scope of activities? If I post another picture 
of baby sloths on the wall of a sloth-obsessed friend, I am not 
indicating something we would do together. The sending of 
sloths and lolruses is itself a practice within our friendship. If I 
listen to a lo-fi Mountain Goats video posted by another friend, 
I do so with the understanding that she listened to it just as I 
am now, and through my experience of the song I understand 
more about her experiences and aesthetic sensibility. Every 
posting can be an invitation to others to encounter the posting 
as if alongside ourselves, and in this way we can have a 
meaningfully robust asynchronous version at a distance of many 
of the everyday material causes of friendship: watching TV or 
a movie, discussing the news or an article, shopping together, 
playing Scrabble, and so forth. Through the limited forms of 
cellphone and camera photos and videos, we can even, in a 
limited and thin way, invite our network to visit our family, or 
keep up to date on our vacation (or a party) as it happens. Now, 
Vallor is concerned specifically with complete friendships and 
friendships of virtue, so she has other reasons to dismiss these 
activities as relatively trivial to her primary concern, but I think 
it important nonetheless to recognize that new social media 
provide us not just with a means of communication but a means 
of living together, and, as Vallor well recognizes, friendships 
of virtue usually come about as a deepening of relationships 
initially established in the pursuit of utility or pleasure.
Old Friends, New Media
To see how new social media are relevant to the possibility of 
deepening relationships towards virtue, consider the difference 
between making contact with old friends via Facebook versus 
via email, telephone, or letter.
In friending someone, there is a very minimal social 
commitment. Users often seem to use friending as a means 
of recreating former social groups, and will friend those with 
whom they have no immediate desire to communicate, but just 
want to check in on, touch base with, or keep in touch with. This 
surely has some negative aspects—users tend to accumulate 
friends who they know and care very little about—but the 
lowered expectation allows people to establish connections 
with those they are very much out of touch with.
The case of the old friend to whom we have little to say 
exemplifies the most characteristic strengths of Facebook as a 
communications platform and as a platform for asynchronous 
shared activity. In this kind of relationship, contact would 
be unlikely in other media, for we would not have sufficient 
initial desire and purpose to motivate the investment of time 
and feeling requisite to reestablish a meaningful relationship. 
The low commitment of friending allows this contact to be 
established, which then, through status updates and news 
feeds, gives us a sense of who our old friend has become, and of 
what the course of her life now consists. We may find we share 
interests, commitments, and projects—either those that once 
bound us together, or others that have arisen in the intervening 
period. We may find we have more in common than expected, 
or we may rediscover, for example, that shared sense of humor 
which had always been the only thing we had in common.
And, on Facebook, a shared sense of humor and fun 
is enough to re-establish a relationship—and, even more 
remarkably, a relationship that can grow. Simple activities with 
scalable levels of interaction, such as Facebook games, allow 
us to move smoothly from playing a game because the game 
is itself diverting to playing a game as a way of being together 
with a friend. Competition and chatting as we play allows a 
return to the quotidian moments of passing time which once 
brought us together, without the artificial attempt to reestablish 
a friendship using means foreign to the shared activities which 
formed an initial, now lapsed bond.
In these ways, Facebook is a remarkably well-suited 
platform for the activity of friendship. Where the connections 
forged are superficial, they allow avenues for growth and 
intensification. Where the messages and posts are terse and 
simple, they allow for conversations and shared experiences 
to emerge. Where the group associations and activities are 
thin and basic, they allow opportunities to raise awareness 
and recruit others to causes that may become passionate 
commitments.
To be sure, the movement of communications technologies 
from the realm of contemplative to that of active life presents 
cultural problems and dangers, but it allows the long-distance 
elements of friendship to become not a mere sharing of 
information about activities engaged in separately, but an 
active asynchronous sharing of activities themselves. This 
active component of new social media communications is 
both important and easily misunderstood, and as long as we 
do not grasp that communications here are not reportage and 
summary, but asynchronously shared experience at a distance, 
much of what happens in new social media will appear to be 
useless self-important triviality. We can call this the “sandwich 
problem.”
Why do people talk about their sandwich? Why do people 
post pictures of lunch? Surely it is not because they are under 
any illusion that their sandwich is of significant objective 
importance. Neither, if we are to be charitable, can we assume 
that it is because the sandwich-sharer believes that he is of such 
great importance to friends and associates that the slightest 
and most uninteresting details of his life take on interest by 
association, like Catholic relics touched by saints. What, then, 
can be the motivation?
This will be ever a mystery to us as long as we believe that 
the point of the communication is the information it contains. 
The point is to invite friends to lunch. The sharer can then eat 
alongside his absent friends, who he knows to be experiencing 
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the appearance of his sandwich, as if sitting across the table. The 
friends, for their part, have been granted this window into the life 
of their friend, which they may either ignore entirely, or choose 
to reflect upon and, in so doing, revitalize their connection. If this 
kind of asynchronous, opt-in broadcast, mediated togetherness-
at-a-distance displaced more robust forms of shared activity, 
this would certainly be a worry—but the point is that we can’t 
even make sense of why people do this unless we accept that 
this is experienced as a shared activity of communion, rather 
than a communication of information.
“Friend” is a verb, now, thanks to Facebook—and it is well 
that this is so. While “friending” is the mere establishment of 
a connection on this social networking site, what is both most 
important and most surprising about Facebook is its affordances 
for friendship as an activity.
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For decades, the artificial intelligence community has questioned 
the validity and strength of the Turing Test as a way to evaluate 
the presence or absence of a mind. Given the recent surge of 
evidence for embodiment theories, the Turing Test has been 
considered largely irrelevant. However, conceptual metaphor 
theory, a strong theory of embodiment, ironically offers a way 
to save the Turing Test. In spite of the fact that the theory, as 
articulated by Lakoff and Johnson (1987, 1999) is explicit in its 
rejection of AI, it offers a strong linguistic basis for evaluating 
the presence of an underlying mind.
Keywords
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It is almost impossible to over-estimate the impact that Alan 
Turing’s 1950 paper Computing Machinery and Intelligence 
has had on the artificial intelligence (AI) community. Turing’s 
historic paper set the stage for a sort of “put up or shut up” 
moment in the field, challenging those who spend their time 
working out what it might mean for a machine to exhibit 
genuine intelligence, and setting the bar for AI theorists 
indefinitely. And while Turing almost certainly never intended 
for his Imitation Game (what has come to be known as the 
Turing Test) to be an operational definition (that only and exactly 
those things that pass it count as intelligent), the test took on a 
life of its own over the sixty-plus years since Turing proposed 
it. In fact, I know of almost no one in the field of AI theory who 
defends the test as written (excepting maybe Daniel Dennett, 
whose defense will be discussed below), and yet it remains the 
benchmark that everyone almost-embarrassingly references, 
seemingly dismissing it as overly simplistic while using the 
same breath to grudgingly admit that no machine or program 
has yet passed it. It is this apparent contradiction that I intend 
to discuss here, while offering evidence and argument that the 
Turing Test is overdue to be re-examined as a potentially valid 
test for artificial intelligence.
Despite the Turing Test being generally the most talked-
about and well-known test for AI, most discussion in the 
literature has remained critical. Particularly in light of what I will 
call the Embodied Revolution in the fields of AI and cognitive 
science, the Turing Test has been pushed even further from 
prominence in recent years. As more and more researchers 
embrace the claims of embodiment theories, a purely linguistic 
test begins to look less and less viable as a candidate for a true 
test of intelligence. By “intelligence,” I include the concept of 
mind or consciousness that is the true goal of AI. (It isn’t clear to 
me what intelligence looks like in the absence of a mind, since 
arguably we have many machines that are already intelligent in 
that sense and yet we do not believe we have achieved true AI. 
Searle’s (1980) distinction here between Strong and Weak AI is 
relevant, and I’m interested only in the notion of Strong AI here.) 
In what follows, I will give the reader a brief background of AI’s 
history, including the role played by the Turing Test, spending 
some time on the Embodied Revolution and what it has meant 
to the field. Then, I will argue that Lakoff and Johnson’s work 
on Conceptual Metaphor specifically (and ironically) offers 
us a reason to re-think this move away from the Turing Test. 
Ultimately, it seems as though one can reject many of the 
assumptions of what Haugeland (1986) called “GOFAI” (Good 
Old-Fashioned AI), including that human thought is primarily 
symbol manipulation, and still accept that the Turing Test is a 
valid test of human-like intelligence.
Historically, AI has gone through a number of research 
paradigms. Different philosophers have carved this history up 
differently, but one can see fairly clearly that there have been at 
least three major approaches to the field, all of which overlap 
one another chronologically at some point, and all of which 
remain active research projects today. We often use the term 
“GOFAI” to describe the earliest work in AI, that which is based 
on the Physical Symbol System Hypothesis of Newell and Simon 
(1976). In their words: 
A physical symbol system has the necessary and 
sufficient means for general intelligent action. By 
“necessary” we mean that any system that exhibits 
general intelligence will prove upon analysis to be 
a physical symbol system. By “sufficient” we mean 
that any physical symbol system of sufficient size can 
be organized further to exhibit general intelligence. 
By “general intelligent action” we wish to indicate 
the same scope of intelligence as we see in human 
action. (116)
It’s not difficult to see how the Physical Symbol System 
Hypothesis approaches the problem of intelligence in AI 
much the same way Turing did, in so far as the focus remains 
firmly on the symbolic representation of information. Although 
Turing wanted to limit the test to only digital computers, the 
